The question of conflict intervention has played out within many different contexts. But, it is always a rather heated discussion that surrounds the topic of conflict intervention; for, within the discourse of conflict intervention there is to be found the ever precarious notion of morality and moral judgments. Prior to 1994, the debate on conflict intervention was largely framed around the idea of the “right to intervene.” The R2I doctrine argues that some states in the international community, because of their military and economic power and established, stable political infrastructure, have the right to intervene in conflicts around the world. This, then, begs the question: Why do states intervene under the R2I doctrine? Taken at face-value, most would answer this question by saying, “Because they can.” However, the explanation has more depth to it than that. Under the R2I doctrine, states often intervene to protect their own interests, whether they be – as they often are – economic, political or even geopolitical. The R2I doctrine often focuses on choosing sides and it is those same economic, political and geopolitical interests that dictate whose side the intervene state will take.
But, during the time period from 1994 to 1996, in the midsts of the Rwandan and Bosnian Civil Wars, a new, controversial doctrine emerged – the “responsibility to protect” doctrine. Pioneered by Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun, the R2P doctrine was the result of a collaboration between many humanist international conflict resolution specialists. It seems the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts spurred Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun – and their collaborators – to action. The R2P doctrine received its first official endorsement in December, 2001 when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty included the term in their report to then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. Since that time the R2P document has been worked into the founding charter of the African Union, the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit and various United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. However, the first United Nations General Assembly Resolution dealing directly with the R2P doctrine was not produced until 14 September, 2009. But, what exactly does the R2P doctrine entail and what does it mean for the international community when intervention is the proverbial “order of the day?” The R2P doctrine can be better understood in three general principles:
1.) A State has the responsibility to guard its citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
2.) If a State does not have the capacity to guard its citizens from stated criteria, the international community has the responsibility to provide the State with the means or resources necessary to guard its citizens from stated criteria.
3.) If a State is failing from guarding its citizens from stated criteria the international community has the responsibility to intervene diplomatically or militarily.
Now that I have provided background on the R2P doctrine I can move on to the purpose of this blog post in the first place – to air my issues with the R2P doctrine. The first among many issues that I have with the R2P doctrine is that it takes the issue of state sovereignty out of the State’s hands. The United Nations being used as an organization that can determine the status of a State’s sovereignty is not an idea that I liken to in the least. The issue of a State’s sovereignty can then be used to justify a military intervention by the United Nations. Now, before you explode in anger and call me a cold, pessimistic, cynic, please allow me to state this: The basic principles of the R2P doctrine I am more than willing to sign on for. Intervening in international civil wars when innocent lives are being destroyed is something that I think is a good idea. I am also even more than willing to sign on to the argument that if a State cannot meet its responsibilities to protect its citizens than said State forfeits its sovereignty and the international then may enact its responsibility to protect. However, where I begin to become worried is that there is currently no mechanism to determine who makes the decision as to when a State has failed to protect its citizens… does the international community make the decision through various diplomatic channels, does the U.N make the decision, does a country uni- or bi-laterally make the decision? None of this is outlined in the U.N. R2P Resolution passed in 2009. Who is making this decision is important, even though it may not appear so at first. It is important to make sure that a sort of international “power” hierarchy is not created as a result of the U.N Resolution’s failure to explain who decides when a State has failed to adequately protect its citizens from atrocities. That power – to make the decision – should not rest with the few powerful Western nations that are used to strong-arm diplomacy. Any mechanism that is implemented must make sure that the decision is as inclusive as possible when the question of determining a States failure to adequately protect its citizens from atrocities is at hand. The second issue that I take with the R2P doctrine is that it largely ignores causal aspects of civil wars where atrocities occur. Under the R2P doctrine, nations are only intervening because innocent lives are being lost to atrocities. So, what, then, happens when the international community intervenes, ends the conflict, and is then left without the slightest idea as to why the civil war was being fought in the first place. This is where conflict resolution and conflict negotiation specialists could lend the conflict intervention specialists a hand. Currently, the R2P doctrine has no mechanism in place that outlines what happens once the conflict ends. Do the intervening countries simply leave… or do they stay and see to the end of the conflict by bringing the two warring sides to the table to negotiate? I think the the R2P doctrine needs more development when the question of “what happens when the conflict is over?” is being asked. Thirdly, I ask this: What happens if a State does not wish for the international community to intervene, regardless of whether or not their efforts to protect their population from atrocities have been declared failed? Of course, proponents of the R2P doctrine would say, “Too bad, so sad. You knew the rules and you failed, therefore we have the right to intervene.” This is all well; however, is does not erase the sentiments of a recalcitrant State. After the conflicts ends, the international community would have to deal with a State that is still a bit upset, perhaps even raged, about the fact that the international community did not respect its wishes, and some would say still further, its sovereignty. What then? Do you punish the State that failed to protect its people? Do you do nothing to them? Do you welcome them back into the General Assembly when the session begins as if nothing at all had taken place?
I suppose the simple explanation is this: The R2P doctrine addresses why and when the international community gets involved in another State’s internal conflict, but does not address what happens in the time succeeding the intervention. To me, the R2P doctrine is a wonderful idea; but, it is lacking further development that would make the doctrine whole and complete. As it stands now, the R2P doctrine is not fully realized. Also, a note: the above explanation of the R2P doctrine and its inception and subsequent implementation is, for the sake of brevity, over-simplified… as are my issues with the R2P doctrine. If you would like a greater and broader discussion, I invite you to leave a comment with your email address in the comment section and I would be more than happy to engage in deeper discussion with you about the R2P doctrine.
But, thank you, dear reader, for taking time out of your day to read my incessant babbling. I appreciate it greatly.
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